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Abstract
The Tag Challenge, sponsored by the US State Department, required locating and
photographing 5 target persons in 5 different cities in the United States and Europe in
less than 12 hours, using only their mug shots. We report on how we used social media
to win this challenge, ﬁnding 3 of the targets. We reﬂect on the difﬁculties we faced,
the lessons we learned, and the implications of this capability.
1 Introduction
Back in 2009, to commemorate the 40th anniversary of the creation of the Internet, the US
Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA) launched its Network Challenge
(also known as the “Red Balloon Challenge”). The challenge aimed to test the limits of
social mobilization and rapid information gathering using social media. It required com-
petitors to locate 10 weather balloons tethered at random locations all over the US. The
winning team, based at MIT, found all balloons within 9 hours by mobilization through so-
cial media [18]. The winning strategy relied on a novel incentive scheme in which people
were rewarded both for reporting balloon sightings, as well as for recruiting their friends to
look for balloons [17]. Further theoretical work proved that the strategy is in fact optimal
in terms of minimizing the investment to recover the information [4], and is also the most
robust to misinformation [16].
In March 2012, the “Tag Challenge,” funded by the US State Department, raised the bar
signiﬁcantly higher (www.tag-challenge.com). The challenge set the unprecedented
taskoflocatingandphotographing5peopleindifferentcities, acrosstwocontinents, within
12 hours. There was a reward of $5000 for the winning team. Only a single mugshot of
each target person (or “suspect”) was released to the teams at 8am local time on the day of
the competition (Figure 1). Each volunteer target wore a t-shirt with the competition logo
(the appearance of which was also not known until the ﬁrst mugshot was released) and
was instructed to follow a 12-hour itinerary designed to reﬂect a normal day. For example,
the New York City suspect started at Columbia University, had breakfast at a cafe nearby,
took the subway to the World Trade Center site, then went shopping, and so on. As such,
the task represented a realistic search for an individual following a characteristic mobility
pattern. The other suspects were in Washington D.C., London, Stockholm, and Bratislava.
1Figure 1: Only information given was a single mug shot per city released at 8:00am local
time
Now, the Tag Challenge is signiﬁcantly harder than the Red Balloon Challenge because
it required locating people in extremely populated cities, where the pace of life can help
people “hide in plain sight” [15]. Therefore, the target people were much harder to spot
than large red balloons. Furthermore, people are mobile, making it difﬁcult to rule out
locations that have already been visited. While the suspects were not explicitly hiding or
in disguise, searching for one moving about in a city like New York, with a population of
8.2 million people, seemed nearly impossible. In particular, it was an open question as to
whether it is possible to use social media to accomplish such a difﬁcult task, as evidenced
by the difﬁculty of ﬁnding suspects in police investigations [19].
Despite these challenges, our team won the challenge by locating 3 of the targets using
a Web platform, a mobile application, and an incentive scheme. This was accomplished
without any of the team members being located in any of the target cities. Speciﬁcally,
Figure 2 shows the targets our team found, and the approximate local time at which we
submitted their photos to the organizers. The targets in London and Stockholm remained
at large, although pursuing them after the allotted 12 hours was not part of the competition.
Other teams used Web sites and social media in combination with a wide range of ap-
proaches, including attention raising measures (e.g., search engine optimization + broad-
casting a high volume of messages on social media), standard incentive measures (e.g.,
promising shares of revenue to participants + pledging winnings to charity), and decep-
tive measures (e.g., impersonating the challenge organizers + attempting to sabotage rivals
teams with a virus). Clearly, there was a wide range of possible strategies in this competi-
tion; our approach was based on an understanding of the key challenges of rapid mobilisa-
tion of crowdsourcing teams. In the next section, we give an overview of these challenges.
2 Challenges
There are at least three distinct problems in crowdsourcing rapid information gathering: (1)
the mobilization of participants; (2) the aggregation of information; (3) and the veriﬁcation
of information. We discuss each one in turn.
2.1 Mobilization
The success of search in social mobilization clearly requires individuals to be motivated to
conduct the search, and to participate in the information diffusion. In an attempt to repli-
cate Stanley Milgram’s “small world experiment” [14], it was observed that the majority
of message forwarding chains observed empirically terminate prematurely. Speciﬁcally,
Dodds et al. conclude that “although global social networks are, in principle, searchable,
actual success depends sensitively on individual incentives” [5]. In other words, a key chal-
lenge in social mobilization is the incentive challenge. It has also been observed that the
success of crowdsourcing mechanisms, in general, can vary depending on the details of the
ﬁnancial incentive scheme in place [12].
2Figure 2: Location of the 5 targets, and local time at which the 3 targets were found
While mobilization requires people to be motivated, in natural disaster situations there
seems to be a very strong intrinsic desire to contribute. Once people identify a focal point
for submitting information (e.g., Ushahidi1 or Cosm2), it becomes a hub and everyone con-
tributes and invites other contributors. So motivation for participation and spreading infor-
mation is less of a concern in such scenarios, and the efforts can be focused on information
aggregation and veriﬁcation.
However, there are many situations in which the level of intrinsic motivation is not as
strong or widespread. Consider the problem of ﬁnding a single missing person or criminal
(as in the Tag Challenge). The sparsity of the information being sought suggests the need
to motivate people to route the problem to others who are better placed to report on it (e.g.,
to someone who lives in the same area as the target or who is likely to come across them
in the course of daily life). This is a much harder task, because the person who eventually
ﬁnds the target is only one element in a chain of participants. This is in contrast to more
conventional crowdsourcing settings like Ushahidi, where the bulk of each task begins and
ends with a single individual. In short, tasks on Ushahidi are independent, whereas each
successful search task requires an uninterrupted chain of motivated participants.
The traditional method of ﬁnding missing persons or criminals requires a central actor
to do all the work in advertising a reward or ransom (respectively), since people have no
incentive to route the information to others. In fact, if someone spots the criminal or has
useful information of their whereabouts, they even have incentive to hide that information
from others to avoid sharing the reward. These features act as barriers to large-scale mobi-
lization in situations where time and resources are critical. Even with the right incentives
to motivate people to act, there are still open questions about the economics and efﬁciency
of the crowdsourcing system. Much academic work in crowdsourcing is now exploring
this problem, for example to optimize the efﬁciency of micro-task markets like Amazon
Mechanical Turk or CrowdFlower [12].
1ushahidi.com
2cosm.com
32.2 Aggregation
Given a sufﬁcient quantity of motivated participants, the next challenge is to aggregate their
responses. Even if we assume, for now, that all contributions are reliable, visualizing and
synthesizing the information into a form that is actionable requires careful thought.
This is the main challenge that platforms such as Ushahidi and Cosm seek to address
[8]. If there is a forest ﬁre or an earthquake, one can use Ushahidi to aggregate geo-tagged
reports posted by thousands of people, then visualize what is going on using the resulting
crisis map. The system has proven its efﬁciency in rapid information aggregation through
various deployments, including the aftermath of the devastating earthquake in Haiti.
However, there are scenarios in which aggregation is less trivial. For example, when the
information submitted has high volume, it is often necessary to identify which information
is most relevant to the task at hand, in order to avoid clutter in the visualized maps. Things
get even harder when aggregating different types of data, for example when combining
spatial and temporal communication data to characterize response to massive emergencies
[2].
2.3 Veriﬁcation
Experience with Ushahidi, however, also highlighted the veriﬁcation problem in crowd-
sourcing. Veriﬁcation is important as people stand to beneﬁt from submitting false reports,
for instance to get more food or receive help sooner, often at the expense of others. In
the case of search, false positives from well-intentioned participants, and malicious reports
from those seeking rewards are also likely. The Metropolitan Police in London have re-
cently released the photographs of 5,000 suspects believed to be involved in the London
riots of 2011 [19]. Cases of mistaken identity are inevitable, especially matching against
poor quality CCTV images. This is known to happen with general crime appeals from
television programs such as Crimewatch in the UK, and America’s Most Wanted in the
USA.
In one of the ﬁrst serious attempts to tackle automatic veriﬁcation, the Ushahidi team
developed a set of algorithms called SwiftRiver, that use machine learning techniques to
classify information sources and content (e.g., Twitter accounts or individual tweets) to
ﬁlter the important/relevant ones. Nevertheless, the problem of veriﬁcation remains a very
signiﬁcant challenge, especially in contentious or competitive domains [13].
3 Our Approach
We formulated a strategy to address these challenges, focusing primarily on the mobiliza-
tion aspect, as we believed the hardest part would be to get people to take action. We detail
this strategy, and our approach to implementing it.
3.1 Strategy
Following the Red Balloon Challenge winning strategy, we used an incentive scheme that
is designed to encourage two things simultaneously: (i) reporting to us if you found a
target; (ii) helping recruit other people to search for the target. We described the strategy
as follows: “If we win, you will receive $500 if you upload an image of a suspect that
is accepted by the challenge organizers. If a friend you invited using your individualized
referral link uploads an acceptable image of a suspect, you also get $100. Furthermore,
recruiters get $1 for each recruit they refer to sign up with us through their individualized
referral link, up to the ﬁrst 2,000 recruits.” The scheme is illustrated in Figure 3.
Here, the incentive to refer others had to be signiﬁcant, because otherwise, attracting
additional participants to the challenge would only decrease an individual’s chances of
4getting a reward. Thus, by paying people for referring their friends, as well as for ﬁnding
suspects, the incentivized behavior changes fundamentally.
Figure 3: Description of the incentive scheme used in our strategy
We found that aggregation and veriﬁcation were not major issues in this competition
because the number of submissions we received was relatively small. In particular, we
manually veriﬁed our submissions in the Tag Challenge, making sure the photograph of the
target matched one of the mugshots provided earlier by the organizers (and the human brain
is very effective at this task). There was a single submission from each city, so aggregation
was not required.
The t-shirts of each target suspect had a unique and previously unknown code, giving
the organizers the ability to tell whether the suspect had really been found. On our part, we
had to make sure this code was legible from the picture. In every case, we contacted the
submitters directly; if part of their backstory was inconsistent with expectations then we
would not have trusted their submission. These activities were all possible because, again,
the number of submissions was small. Clearly, such a detailed approach would not be pos-
sible at larger scale, although we have recently proposed a mechanism for crowdsourcing
the veriﬁcation tasks simultaneously with the search tasks [16].
3.2 Implementation
To facilitate our strategy, we designed and built a web application that allows people to
submit photographs of suspects online and recruit other people into our campaign. To
reward participants for recruitment, it was important to be able to trace a new recruit to the
existing recruit who referred them (where applicable). This was accomplished by providing
an individualized referral link to share on social networks, a process made easier through
the site’s template email and social media sharing links.
Figure 4 shows the distribution of clicks to our team’s web site over the week leading up
tothechallenge. Theﬁgureclearlyhighlightsthattheareasofinterestaregenerallyfocused
around the target cities (New York, Washington, Stockholm, London and Bratislava).
We also built a mobile phone app that allows people to view the list of suspects as
they are released, and submit pictures of them directly from their phones. The app was
released on the Android Market. Social media platforms were not ignored, as we went
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Figure 4: Heatmap showing distribution of visitors to our team’s site
about creating a Twitter feed and Facebook page for people to follow and like, respectively,
so they could receive updates.
Somewhat to our surprise, neither the web platform nor the mobile app were used very
much for submission during the competition. Successful participants in our team preferred
to submit their photos via email, suggesting that when important information needs to be
reported, people value direct communication rather than going through ofﬁcial channels.
Perhapsthiscouldbeexplainedongroundsofconvenience(i.e., eachnewplatformrequires
a learning curve for participants), or the lack of trust that highly valuable information (i.e.,
the winning photos) will not get lost in a sea of noise. The web site and the app are both
components of a crowdsourcing platform being developed by our team, so addressing these
issues are important for scalability.
Nevertheless, both the web platform and mobile app contributed signiﬁcantly to our
credibilitybydemonstratingcommitmentandWebpresence. Thishelpedsigniﬁcantlywith
the ﬁnal element of our approach, which was to generate as much attention as possible for
our team on blogs and news Web sites. We sent out press releases explaining our interest
in the challenge, and posted notes about our team in related forums. We next explain how
our strategy gave us an advantage over the other teams.
4 Other Teams
We were able to succeed by leveraging a combination of social media and information
hubs, and by building up a reputation as a credible, reliable team. In this section, we
highlight some of the tactics used by other teams, including deceptive ones, and reﬂect on
their effectiveness and implications. Neither we nor any other team were able to ﬁnd the
suspects in London or Stockholm (despite signiﬁcant coverage in the former).
We are aware of the existence of ﬁve serious opposing teams. Some teams (e.g., team
@WeTagChallenge) used search engine optimization tactics to raise the proﬁle of their
team websites above that of other teams. On the other hand, another team with Twitter
handle @TAG challenge apparently attempted a “man in the middle” attack using a
name that was very similar to the ofﬁcial @TAGchallenge account. We suspect that
they may have been attempting to pose as the actual TAG Challenge organizers in order to
intercept submissions, even to the extent of duplicating the ofﬁcial tweets.
Yet another team, with the Twitter handle @TeamRave, mostly ran its campaign on
Twitter and its Web site. They promised the entire $1,000 share for each accepted suspect
6picture, leaving no incentive for people to recruit others.
The most serious (and aggressive) competitor was “Tag Team.” They used an incentive
scheme similar to ours ($400 to ﬁnder, $100 to referrer) with an added twist – instead of
using the remainder to build up a critical mass of recruits, they promised that the remaining
$500 per suspect would go to charity. Their strategy for spreading awareness consisted
predominantly of their Twitter account @TagTeam surﬁng trending hashtags, and tweet-
spamming many individuals, social, governmental and private organizations in the target
cities, often with an explicit plea for a retweet. The vast majority of these were ignored and,
we believe, reduced their credibility. Interestingly, they sent many tweets that mentioned
the @TAG challenge handle, which was, as described earlier, the handle of an imposter
account.
In the days leading up to the challenge, Tag Team also tweeted messages targeted at
our team, including speciﬁc attacks on our team’s competence and members and tweets
encouraging people not to support us. Another “black hat” tactic employed by Tag Team
was the acquisition of a large number of fake Twitter followers, ostensibly purchased. Two
days before the challenge began, their number of Twitter followers went from 37 to over
12,000, literally overnight. Presumably, their goal was to give an impression that they were
the most promising team, and thereby harness the bandwagon effect. This, however, does
not seem to have helped, as their following did not subsequently increase very much.
In summary, it appears that most competitors focused purely on social media, almost
exclusively using Twitter to spread their message. This narrow strategy was not sufﬁcient,
not least because several teams came to be perceived as spammers. As a result, none of the
other teams successfully located more than 1 out of the 5 suspects.
Our team was far more selective in its tweets and social media strategy, but also made
sure to generate as much attention as possible in blogs and online news. Even a small
comparative initial advantage in credibility and awareness can lead to eventual victory in
this competitive domain. This phenomenon can be explained in the following way. A
valid photograph of one of the targets has value, because there is prize money provided
by the organizers. Hence, any participant in possession such a photograph needs to decide
carefully which team to send it to. The ﬁrst barrier for a team in receiving this information
is for the participant to simply be aware of them. But secondly, and just as importantly,
the participant must also trust the team leadership to give the promised rewards for such
valuable information. Finally, the participant must have conﬁdence in the likelihood of the
team’s victory –that is, an expectation that other participants would also submit their photos
to that team.
Focusing on these qualities, and enhancing them through carefully considered incen-
tives, allowed our team to get an early lead in ﬁnding suspects. We then made sure to
publicize these early successes in real time on social media, which contributed to even
greater levels of credibility and awareness. This positive feedback loop ensured that we
were always ahead of the other teams.
Nevertheless, other teams ranked higher than us in Klout score3. This is a measure
of inﬂuence and credibility across a user’s social network obtained by data mining. This
allows us to quantify the inﬂuence of each team’s online presence (Table 1). Tag Team, the
team that sent out numerous tweets and appeared to have purchased thousands of Twitter
followers, ranked ﬁrst by Klout score. This raises an interesting question: how important
is that score for time-critical tasks and how good is it at ﬁltering out attempts to engineer
a higher score? It may very well be that the score works for more conventional online
behavior, but not for a time-critical task such as the Tag Challenge. Developing a “time-
critical Klout score” is therefore an interesting open question.
A ﬁnal tactic employed against our team seems to have been direct attack. Between
GMT 16:57 and GMT 17:00, four submissions were received, each for a different sus-
pect, and all from the same user. The submitted ﬁles turned out to be copies of the same
3klout.com
7Team’s Twitter Handle Klout score Reach Amplif Style
@TagChallenge 32 126 6 socializer
@TagTeam 26 54 4 conversationalist
(winner) @CrowdScannerHQ 21 38 3 explorer
@Tag Challenge 16 20 3 dabbler
@TeamRave 10 1 2 observer
Table 1: Table reporting the Klout score, Reach and Amplif for the ﬁve teams
participating to the challenge
executable ﬁle. Upon dissection, this executable contained references to various critical op-
erating system libraries. This was assessed as, at best, an attempt to annoy us, or at worst,
an attempt to make our systems vulnerable to an attack. The afﬁliation of the attacker is
unknown, but malicious intent could not be ruled out.
5 Lessons Learned
The main goal of the Tag Challenge was to test the limits of social mobilization in a time-
critical competitive environment. We were able to ﬁnd only 3 out of 5 suspects within the
allotted 12 hours, in contrast to the Network Challenge, where all of the balloons were
found in under 9 hours. However, the Tag Challenge was arguably more difﬁcult as the
targets were not static and we needed to recruit participants dispersed across the globe
with three separate languages. These considerations make the result of the competition —
ﬁnding 3 out of 5 suspects — a testimony to the power of social media, which really pushed
the boundaries of social mobilization.
Looking again at the fact that we found only 3 out of the 5 suspects, we may extract
some conclusions about the difﬁculty of the challenge, compared to the Red Balloon chal-
lenge. Members of our team were geographically close to only one of the cities where
suspects were present –Southampton is one hour away from London. Yet, we failed to ﬁnd
the London suspect. This could be a ﬁrst lesson: geographical proximity does not guaran-
tee anything, and that ours is really a de-localized technique. Being in 4 countries, across 2
continents, and having to deal with 3 different languages can also hinder the propagation of
recruitment. But a comprehensive understanding of the role of these factors requires more
systematic investigation than is afforded by a single run of the challenge.
Interestingly, social networks did not play an explicit role in our victory. While Face-
book and Twitter are the most natural tools for social mobilization, we found it extremely
difﬁcult to promote our Facebook page and Twitter accounts (other teams seemed to face
the same predicament). For instance, all of our efforts amounted only to a few dozen Face-
book “likes” and Twitter followers. Nonetheless, these media were extremely important
for at least two reasons. Firstly, they added to the credibility of our team by displaying
the team’s history in the form of wall posts and tweets. Secondly, the reach extended be-
yond the immediate fans and followers. While fewer than 50 people “liked” our Facebook
page, the number of unique users (as measured by Facebook statistics) exposed to it be-
fore the competition exceeded 300, and we consequently received around 500 hits on our
main team’s Web site in the 24 hours leading up to and during the challenge. Further-
more, Facebook and Twitter enabled a broadcast-style communication to the most impor-
tant people—the ones who explicitly expressed their interest. In particular, updates about
our successes (in ﬁnding targets) were immediately posted to Facebook, Twitter, and our
Web site, sending an encouraging signal that we were the strongest team.
The majority of the visitors who came to our Web site did so after reading a post about
the challenge on Slashdot and comments we left in forums discussing the challenge. More
8traditional forms of online media also played an important role in making people aware of
the challenge and our team: we were mentioned in CNET, ZDNet, and by our respective
universities’ press teams.
It is also worth noting that 2 of the 3 people in our team who found a suspect had an
existing interest or connection to crowdsourcing. The suspect in Bratislava was found by a
computer science graduate interested in crowdsourcing. David Alan Grier, president-elect
of the IEEE Computer Society, produces a regular podcast on crowdsourcing and was re-
sponsible for ﬁnding the suspect in Washington D.C. This feature of successful participants
could simply come from the fact that most of the participants in our team had an existing
interest in crowdsourcing, an afﬁnity that is important to motivation in social mobilization
[10]. Indeed, the majority of our post-competition survey respondents indicated interest in
social mobilization and crowdsourcing.
Another interesting aspect is that, like in the ﬁnancial markets where successful and
proﬁtable strategies are copied by investors over time and lose proﬁtability, query incentive
cascades [11], while novel in the balloon challenge, were copied in this challenge. An open
question, again, ishowthiswouldplayagainsttheuseofthisstrategy, ifatall. Furthermore,
if crowdsourcing is used extensively and indiscriminately, the large number of such search
tasks of which a person will be aware could possibly result in information overload, to the
detriment of any one task. In this case, it would be useful to study as to how tasks can
be targeted at speciﬁc individuals, depending on their location, interests, mobility, network
structure, and other relevant features.
The inﬂuence of competition on the efﬁciency of the search deserves some attention.
Since we found every other suspect that others found, we can assume that the competition
with the others did not harm the propagation of our network. However, a conclusive answer
requires further investigation into the role of competition.
In Figure 5 we summarize the main lessons learned.
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Main Lessons Learned:
1. Social mobilization is both easy and hard: We can, in principle,
ﬁnd people within 12 hours; diversity of country/language/culture
plays against social mobilization.
2. Social networks are not a silver bullet: Gathering a large Twit-
ter/Facebook following is hard, in which case, publicity through
other online media (e.g., social news websites, online forums,
press releases) becomes indispensable.
3. Credibility matters: It is important to build a proﬁle as a credible
team, which has good chances of winning.
4. Incentives matter: Focus on recruiting motivated people with ex-
isting domain knowledge, and afﬁnity with the task.
5. Effect of competitiveness is little understood: Whether inter-team
and/or inter-task competition hinders overall social mobilization
warrants further investigation.
Figure 5: Summary of lessons learned
96 Concluding Remarks
Our success in the Tag Challenge is another testimony to the power of technology-mediated
social mobilization. Involving vast geographical spread, target mobility, and time critical-
ity, it has profound implications for social search. The challenge also helped us appreciate
the limitations of the technology and the challenges it faces. The fact that we could not
locate all targets within the allotted time highlights the difﬁculty of the task, and shows that
social media is not a silver bullet. Much work needs to be done to exploit the technology’s
full potential, but also to put in place safeguards for preventing its abuse.
We foresee growing potential for applications that support time-critical social mobi-
lization in the real world. In particular, one application is employing social networks for
ﬁnding missing children or missing persons. Our experience complements recent lessons
learned about the use of crowdsourcing in processing large number of satellite images in
the search for computer scientist Jim Gray, who was lost at sea –a search that unfortu-
nately did not succeed in locating him [7]. There is a need for more dedicated platforms
for facilitating this, allowing efﬁcient sharing of useful information. As is the case with
the Tag Challenge and the Red Balloon Challenge, such applications will likely beneﬁt
from explicitly rewarding the routing of information and recruiting the right individuals for
the search (e.g., those familiar with the geographies or urban areas of interest) [9]. One
can also use these techniques to enable people to report on environmental violations (e.g.,
someone dumping pollutants in a river), or to map natural disasters in real-time (e.g., the
spread of a forest ﬁre) or after they occur (e.g., mapping damage after an earthquake) [8].
Again, social networks may be very useful here, since there is potentially useful informa-
tion embedded within the network about volunteers that may have access to geographically
relevant information. Crowdsourcing using social networks and human-based sensing can
also be used to encourage data collection by citizen science volunteers [6]. For example,
the Cornell Lab of Ornithology are already using volunteers to collect large-scale scientiﬁc
data about urban and wildlife [3].
In short, this technology can be used to mobilize volunteers in faraway places to achieve
highly distributed, possibly time-critical tasks. We are working on a general “social mo-
bilization app” that anyone can use to build and coordinate teams of volunteers rapidly to
address difﬁcult, geographically distributed challenges [6].
Around 60 years ago, legendary social psychologist Stanley Milgram redeﬁned our no-
tion of social distance with his “six degrees of separation” experiment [14], showing that
we are, on average, only 6 hops of friendship away from anyone else on earth. Face-
book found the degree of separation to be only 4 in their network [1]. Endeavors like the
“Tag Challenge” are set to redeﬁne our conception of the temporal and spatial limits of
technology-mediated social mobilization in the Internet age, showing that we can ﬁnd any
person (who isn’t particularly hiding) in less than 12 hours.
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